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Maybe If We Turn It Off and
Then Turn It Back On Again?
Exploring Health Care Reform as a
Means to Curb Cyber Attacks
Deborah R. Farringer

Introduction
In this digital age, hardly a day goes by without a
story in the news about identity theft,1 a ransomware
attack,2 a data breach exposing personal data,3 or other
instance in which electronic information is unintendedly or deliberately disclosed to third parties.4 While
these cyber-related events have become increasingly
common, the movement towards electronic storage of
information and electronic transactions and communication has continued unabated because the benefits
of electronic communication tools exceed the associated risks.5 The health care industry is no exception.
It has moved at a rapid pace away from paper records
to an electronic platform across almost all sectors —
much of it at the encouragement and insistence of the
federal government.6 Such rapid expansion, however,
has increased exponentially the risk to individuals.
This risk is not simply financial or reputational to the
extent that sensitive patient data is exposed to third
parties, but also has become increasingly a risk to an
individual’s physical safety when medical records are
inaccessible to providers or when attackers tamper
with records data or medical device use or data.7
Globally, the health care industry is in the bottom third of industries when it comes to frequency
of breaches,8 but certain unique challenges make it a
leader in other categories.9 For example, in 2018, the
average per capita cost of a data breach for the health
care industry globally was $408,10 which was over $200
higher than the cost experienced by the next closest
sector — the Financial sector — and nearly three times
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the global average per capita cost of $148.11 There are a
number of factors that contribute to this figure. First,
the health care industry has an unusually high churn
rate due to the multitude of electronic health record
(“EHR”) vendors.12 Also, unlike most other industries,
the health care industry and its various sectors are
regulated and managed by multiple federal and state
agencies that each have some level of oversight or jurisdiction over certain aspects of the industry, making it
difficult for those in the industry to adopt a coordinated and cohesive approach to cybersecurity.13
Consequently, when the United States Congress
took action to increase cybersecurity across the nation
under the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015 (CISA), it recognized the health care industry
required a different approach.14 Through this law,
Congress established the Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force (“Task Force”) for the purpose of
reviewing cybersecurity risks within the health care
industry and identifying who will lead and coordinate
efforts to address such risks among the various agencies.15 The Task Force issued a report in June of 2017
(the “Report”),16 setting forth six high-level imperatives
that the health care industry needs to achieve in order
to combat cybersecurity, each accomplished through
multiple recommendations and action items.17 Notably, many of the vulnerabilities plaguing the industry
that are identified in the Report as requiring correction are not necessarily related to specific flaws in the
current cybersecurity framework, but rather susceptibilities presented by the infrastructure and associated regulatory regime that has evolved over the last
few decades over the health care industry generally.18
That is, the current health care infrastructure by its
nature exacerbates cybersecurity risk. Among these
infrastructure obstacles, the Task Force noted that a
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lack of information sharing of industry threats, risks,
and mitigations,19 disparate leadership and governance goals for cybersecurity,20 and the confluence
and contradiction of existing federal and state laws
that have all led to heightened cyber risk for the health
care industry.21 Further, operational system challenges
such as fragmentation in the current fee-for-service
delivery system and its resulting lack of care coordination, disparate attention-span of various industry
participants — especially providers — for implementation of cybersecurity initiatives, and lack of available
resources across and among sectors to promote cybersecurity as a priority all threaten cybersecurity.22 Solutions that are reactive to problems within the current
infrastructure will likely have little long term impact
toward reducing cybersecurity vulnerabilities because
they do not address the underlying system challenges.
The Task Force acknowledges these challenges, and, at
times, avers that the certain recommendations might

and until some general system redesign is achieved
that allows for (1) greater sharing of resources among
industry participants to ensure the same protections
are implemented at all levels of the industry, which
can be strengthened through greater interoperability of systems across the health care industry;25 and
(2) increased focus and attention on the importance
of cybersecurity issues as a priority among system
reforms. Finally, Part IV concludes by offering some
suggestions and recommendations for which system
redesigns should lead the way that will most effectively put the health care industry in the best possible
position to mitigate cybersecurity risk.

I. Background
While the push toward EHRs was perhaps officially
spurred with the enactment of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),26
it has taken the health care industry a number of years

[If ] in fact the current health care delivery infrastructure is a contributing
factor to the incidents of cybersecurity attacks and the exorbitant costs
associated with resolving data breaches, should Congress look not just to curb
breach incidents, but to address root cause systematic challenges in the health
industry infrastructure that create increased exposure of cybersecurity threats?
need to be transformative to the system,23 but falls
short of suggesting more comprehensive reform as a
means to address cybersecurity risk.24 Still, the question remains: if in fact the current health care delivery
infrastructure is a contributing factor to the incidents
of cybersecurity attacks and the exorbitant costs associated with resolving data breaches, should Congress
look not just to curb breach incidents, but to address
root cause systematic challenges in the health industry
infrastructure that create increased exposure of cybersecurity threats?
Exploring this question, in Part I, the article examines the current cybersecurity crisis and what efforts
have been made thus far to address and defend against
existing known cybersecurity threats. Part II analyzes
the specific recommendations set forth by the Task
Force to identify certain themes that have emerged
regarding systematic challenges that are counter
indicated for curbing cyber risks and explores infrastructure reform initiatives to analyze how such programs could aid in curbing cyberattacks. In Part III,
this article argues that cybersecurity risks will continue to be heightened and more costly to the health
care industry as compared to other industries unless
92

and different legislative efforts to achieve more widespread EHR adoption.27 Finally, following enactment
of the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) in 2009, health
care providers undertook rapid and widespread adoption of EHR systems.28 By 2017, nearly eighty-six percent (86%) of physicians used an EHR system (with
just over seventy-nine percent (79%) using a certified
EHR system),29 and ninety-six percent (96%) of all
hospitals possessed a certified EHR system.30
While more comprehensive use of EHRs across
various providers has had certain positive impacts
on health care services and quality care through a
decrease in prescribing errors, reduction of duplication of services, compliance with standards of care,
and improvement of patient safety,31 the transition
to an electronic format has been challenging and not
without controversy.32 Certainly, regulators anticipated the need for increased privacy and security
measures once data was transferred into an electronic
format and more widely shared among providers and
suppliers, as evidenced by enactment of HIPAA and
its privacy and security regulations.33 But, the modern
day sophistication and skill of internet hackers and
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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other cyber criminals and associated tactics could not
yet have been imagined.34 Thus, while the health care
industry and its patients are by now well trained on
standard HIPAA privacy protections, many providers remain unaware or unprepared for more comprehensive cybersecurity risks posed by deliberate third
party actors.35
Certainly, the health care industry has not been
alone in facing a frightening new reality of cyberespionage and theft of intellectual property, trade
secrets, and government information.36 Noting an
1100% increase in incidents of loss, theft, and exposure of personally identifiable information from 2006
to 2015,37 U.S. Congress reacted to this new threat by
enacting the CISA.38 The CISA established the Task
Force and tasked it to to address cybersecurity in the
unique setting of the health care industry in the form
of six tasks.39 The Task Force issued six imperatives
and related recommendations and action items.40
Noting the challenges in attempting to create uniform recommendations for an industry described as
a “mosaic,”41 the Task Force identified three major risk
areas across the industry.42 First, it noted that there
is a distribution of different types of risks across the
health care value chain in the context of cybersecurity,
which includes risk to: the confidentiality of medical
records data; the availability of the data; the integrity of the data; and patient safety.43 Further, these
risks vary across the numerous sectors that comprise
the health care industry.44 For example, the greatest cybersecurity risk to a healthcare provider in the
provider’s daily practice might be of little to no risk
to an equipment manufacturer. Ensuring protection
of each part of the EHR system, however, is critical
to the protection of the system as a whole.45 Second,
the Task Force considered risks to EHRs specifically
and noted that while lack of interoperability is one of
the obstacles that creates the greatest risk to achieving cybersecurity, interoperability through a “shared,
publicly-available application interface could expose
EHRs to additional attack vectors.”46 Thus, any potential solutions or a regulatory framework designed to
establish interoperability must be developed with
these increased risks in mind.47 Interoperability and
how to achieve it has been a particularly vexing issue
over the years, as a number of initiatives for health
information exchanges have been attempted, but few
successes have been realized in achieving wide-spread
use or adoption.48 Achieving greater data sharing while
simultaneously protecting this now consolidated data
remains a key area of concern. Lastly, the Task Force
considered risks posed through medical devices, software, and other connected devices that are not themselves a medical record, but compromise the integrity

of the whole because of the connectedness to an EHR
network more generally.49
Acknowledging these differing risks and having
established the lens through which the Task Force
worked in trying to consider the best approach for
cybersecurity, the Task Force provided recommendations and action items both specific to particular sectors or devices and broadly directed to the industry
more generally.50 The breadth and depth of the recommendations and action items demonstrate how challenging mitigating cyber risk is and will continue to be
in the health care setting.51 As contrasted by HIPAA
statutes and regulations, the imperatives encompass
confidentiality and security related to the maintenance
of such confidentiality, along with the competing concerns of access to information, integrity of information,
and related potential harm to patients if the information is either inaccessible or compromised.52 Thus, the
Report considers numerous ways in which the industry is vulnerable to cyber threats and addresses each
particular threat, presenting action items for how each
could be remedied or approached.53 The Task Force
concedes that its structure could encourage industry
participants to implement only such action items that
pertain to one’s specific needs.54 The Task Force warns
against adopting only some of the action items, however, because it will not likely achieve the same benefits
and will not “maximize [one’s] financial investments
and personnel resources.”55
In the two years since the issuance of the Report,
Congress has taken additional legislative action to
address some of the specific challenges of interoperability and connectivity.56 The 21st Century Cures
Act (the “Cures Act”),57 enacted in 2016,58 seeks to
promote(s) nationwide interoperability that thus far
has been plagued by “deficits in trust between organizations and by anti-competitive behavior that results
in the holding of patient [electronic health information]”59 and by the sheer number of EHR vendors
that exist, each on different platforms and designed
for different specialties.60 The Cures Act requires the
Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) to “defin[e] the requirement for health IT developers of certified health IT
to publish application programming interfaces (APIs)
that can be used ‘without special effort’ to drive individual, clinician, and payer access to clinical data; and
[to develop] a comprehensive approach to address
information blocking.”61 Further, the Cures Act directs
the ONC to “develop or support a trusted exchange
framework, including a common agreement among
health information networks (HINs) nationally.”62 The
ONC has released two drafts of the Trusted Exchange
Framework and Common Agreement, which endeavor
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to create the necessary rules and regulations for sharing electronic health information across networks and
develop a governance structure that can eventually
spur interoperability between disparate networks to
increase quality care and patient safety.63 While the
ONC acknowledges the need for HINs to establish
baseline privacy and security requirements as required
by HIPAA, the Common Agreement does not utilize
HIPAA requirements as a baseline.64
It cannot be overstated that interoperability poses its
own unique set of challenges, including the fact that
one effect of interoperability is greater amounts of data
consolidated into one place.65 Certainly, this is a reason
to be both cautious and thoughtful when considering
implementation and infrastructure of interoperability. While these concerns remain, the Task Force recognizes that increased interoperability and promotion
of a common security framework can have a positive
impact on curbing cyberattacks66 and as progress
towards achievement of its ultimate goals.67
In addition to interoperability, the Task Force has
reported some progress in each of the six imperatives,
ranging from development or participation on certain
committees to the creation of educational and resource
materials to inform the industry about the need for
action and diligence.68 As with the imperatives themselves and the impacts of the associated action items,
progress has been variable across sectors,69 but no
changes have been able to fundamentally transform
cybersecurity wholesale.70 Thus, various sectors of the
industry are taking action on certain items, but widespread movement towards an industry-wide effort to
tackle common and complex security issues remains
stagnant. It is not surprising that early efforts have concentrated primarily on educational efforts, as the Task
Force recognizes that one of the biggest challenges to
addressing cybersecurity will be mitigating the current
fatigue that many providers in the industry are already
feeling with the move into the digital space.71

II. Structural Challenges to Cybersecurity
Recommendations
The Report has elicited certain themes regarding the
key structural challenges that exist within the health
care industry that make addressing cybersecurity risks
especially difficult.72 First, the size and structure of the
various organizations that comprise the health care
industry across all of its sectors are hugely diverse,
which often results in a disparity of resources to implement system-wide change.73 This structural reality creates implementation barriers across a number of different imperatives and recommendations.74 Although
diversity of size, scale, and scope by itself is not necessarily a detriment to the patient-level delivery of
94

health care services75 or to the provision of quality care,
it does create a significant incongruence in how differing components of the health care industry — even
within sectors — are reacting and responding to cybersecurity risks.76 Thus, while large systems might have
the resources, infrastructure, governance support,
and personnel to implement the necessary tools to be
prepared for a cyberattack, a small physician practice
might have limited resources and little motivation to
dedicate hard-earned practice dollars to security for
EHRs.77 Similarly, large-scale medical device manufacturers might have an entire team of people focused on
ongoing data security and protection, whereas a small
manufacturer might have limited resources beyond
basic production and maintenance.78 This resource
disparity is not an issue that is easily addressed at
the sector-level or at the industry-level given that the
dichotomy of organizational size and financial capabilities is at least in some part a product of the existing
legal framework that hinders consolidation and collaboration rather than encourages or promotes resource
sharing.79 That said, even when legal waivers have been
granted to try and ease these regulatory burdens, moving into a new and different payment structure has
been difficult and challenging.80
Second, the existing regulatory scheme that governs
the health care industry, including the Affordable Care
Act (ACA),81 HIPAA, HITECH, the Physician SelfReferral Law (known as the “Stark Law”),82 the Antikickback Statute (AKS),83 the False Claims Act,84 and
various other state laws, provides significant barriers
toward collaboration and interoperability. The Stark
Law and the AKS often stand as obstacles toward the
sharing of resources that could facilitate larger organizations assisting smaller organizations with technology and cybersecurity resource needs.85 The Report
stated: “We strongly encourage Congress to evaluate
an amendment to [the Stark Law and the AKS] specifically for cybersecurity software that would allow
health care organizations the ability to assist physicians in the acquisition of this technology, through
either donation or subsidy.”86 It should be noted that
CMS published a proposed rule for modernizing the
Stark Law on October 17, 2019.87 Included in the proposed rule is an amendment to the existing Stark Law
exception that would clarify the requirement regarding interoperability, prohibit information blocking
and data locking, and further include software and
hardware that is not only related to the EHR itself
but is instead for cybersecurity purposes to “protect”
EHRs.88 CMS is seeking comments about whether to
make the exception permanent or extend the current
timeline, which contemplates the exception sunsetting after a time.89
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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Although certain exceptions and safe harbors exist
that provide health care organizations with some protections, those exceptions and safe harbors do not go
far enough to assist with expenses and resource needs
that extend beyond an initial purchase or implementation.90 Additionally, some organizations are bound
by state laws that apply similar restrictions as those
imposed at the federal level.91 Moreover, even if hardware and software challenges are addressed under
applicable exceptions and safe harbors, other federal
laws such as HIPAA and HITECH create data sharing barriers.92 Indeed, the Task Force noted that even
the threat of breaches and penalties, fines and public disclosure can chill an organization from sharing
information with other providers.93 While the ACA
created some avenues for greater collaboration and
data sharing,94 programs such as the Medicare Shared
Savings Program do not act as a complete waiver of
existing constraints under the Stark Law, the AKS, the
False Claims Act, and applicable antitrust law; rather
these laws impose other obligations and requirements
that have made widespread provider adoption incongruent.95 Because mitigating cybersecurity risk is premised at least in part on the ability to share information and anticipate new attacks, the complicated and
web-like regulatory structure remains a challenge for
the industry, especially providers.
A third theme emerging from the Report is the challenges posed by the continued lack of consistent and
secure interoperability among and between systems,
providers, medical devices, medication delivery systems, and other “Internet of Things” (IoT).96 Granted,
of those systematic challenges that complicate meaningfully addressing cybersecurity risk, interoperability
seems to be the area with the most currently active
and ongoing reform efforts.97 Such reform efforts,
however, have been inconsistent in their application, beginning with attempts to implement stateled health information exchanges before moving to a
more federally-led effort as set forth under the Trusted
Exchange Framework.98 The convenience and advantages of connectivity among various medical devices
and other technology, such as wearable technology or
programmable pacemakers, is prompting such connectivity to take place prior to any comprehensive
regulations or requirements.99 Absent clear guidance
regarding a specific infrastructure for interoperability,
many data users, including providers and patients, are
creating their own mechanisms for sharing data, not
all of which may be as secure as would be required or
recommended by industry guidance.100
Additionally, connecting all of the various sectors makes sense at the patient level, but the sectors
themselves are not governed by the same agencies and

therefore are subject to disparate rules and regulations.101 For example, the federal Food & Drug Administration (FDA) has created guidance for Postmarket
Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices to
address some of these vulnerabilities, but the guidance
is voluntary and addresses a portion of the “stakeholders,” many of which are not regulated by the FDA.102
Thus, although interoperability could address some
cybersecurity concerns, connectivity without interoperability creates greater risk and vulnerabilities for
the industry as a whole.103 Achieving interoperability
can actually mitigate known risks if it promotes large,
resource heavy industry leaders to implement necessary controls across the continuum.
Finally, the fourth theme arising out of the Report
regarding systematic obstacles relates to the myriad
regulatory agencies that govern different aspects of
the health care industry, which lack coordination and
consistency in their approaches to cybersecurity risk
mitigation.104 Medical devices exemplify the quagmire
that competing regulatory agencies create in the context of cybersecurity.105 The FDA governs the manufacture and sale of medical devices, including the marketing of and the safety and efficacy of such devices.106
Medical devices often times will contain personal
health information, but manufacturers are not subject
to HIPAA or the security regulations governing providers.107 In contrast, the providers who use, install,
and work with medical devices are subject to HIPAA
for purposes of privacy and confidentiality of patient
data, which is overseen by the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR).108 OCR imposes its own set of regulations and
assesses applicable penalties for violations of HIPAA
or HITECH regulations,109 independent of other rules
and regulations imposed by the CMS and enforced by
the Office of Inspector General, and the Federal Trade
Commission.110 Yet, in order to mitigate cybersecurity
risk, there needs to be a consistent approach among all
components of an electronic health system, including
medical devices, EHRs, medication delivery systems,
and other IoT items. Although agencies have promoted
industry participants to follow the National Insitute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) standards, all such
recommendations are voluntary and do not necessarily
align with existing regulatory structures.111
Although some of the specific recommendations
and action items can be accomplished, these four systematic issues seem to permeate through all of the
six imperatives and impact the ability for the health
care industry to focus its attention on specific cybersecurity issues such as preventing ransomware attacks
or shoring up other EHR vulnerabilities. Unless and
until there are changes to the health care infrastructure itself, there is a danger that entities will undertake
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recommendations and action items that are the most
easily accomplished, leaving some of the most vexing
imperatives implemented only in part.112 Unfortunately, this seems to be exactly what the Task Force was
attempting to guard against when it stated that partial
adoption of the recommendations and action items
will not “maximize their financial investments and personnel resources.”113 Granted, wholesale adoption of all
recommendations and action items will be challenging
to achieve without comprehensive system reform.

not seek to address some of the interoperability and
resource issues and help promote greater emphasis on
the importance of cybersecurity efforts will do little to
correct many of the systematic challenges mentioned
above. The United Kingdom (U.K.)116 provides a case
study of this point: in 2018, the U.K.’s National Health
Service (NHS) experienced a massive data breach
when it was attacked by the “WannaCry hack,” which
shut down access to and demanded ransom payments
from a third of hospital trusts in the U.K. and eight
percent (8%) of primary care practices.117 The attack

Many of the barriers to the industry, however, are not specific cybersecurity
challenges, but are issues intertwined and endemic to the very nature of the
current healthcare infrastructure. Therefore, while the Report is important
work, it is insufficient to help fuel significant movement or change that will
take adequate steps to enhance cybersecurity generally until more meaningful
reform is enacted or implemented that addresses some of the systematic
infrastructure issues that exacerbate cybersecurity risks.
III. Argument
What seems clear when considering these themes collectively is that identifying the structural issues that
will create greater cybersecurity risk for the healthcare
industry is a necessary first step because it narrows the
scope of the types of reforms that will impact cyber
risk. Many of the barriers to the industry, however, are
not specific cybersecurity challenges, but are issues
intertwined and endemic to the very nature of the current healthcare infrastructure. Therefore, while the
Report is important work, it is insufficient to help fuel
significant movement or change that will take adequate steps to enhance cybersecurity generally until
more meaningful reform is enacted or implemented
that addresses some of the systematic infrastructure
issues that exacerbate cybersecurity risks.114
Health care “reform” has become a rather generic
term, but can mean a number of different types of
changes to healthcare delivery and payment mechanisms. Most, if not all, ongoing reform initiatives
and current reform proposals address only some of
the systematic barriers that complicate cybersecurity advancement. For example, so-called “Medicare
for All” proposals that have been suggested by various Democratic candidates are largely focused on
payment and access reform.115 While these goals are
laudable, when considering cybersecurity specifically, a single payor system or public option that does

96

was thought to have occurred due to the use by several hospital trusts and primary care practices of
Windows XP, an operating system that dates back to
2001 and that Microsoft ceased to support in 2014.118
While NHS provides health care services to any and
all residents who need the services, similar to what is
contemplated in a Medicare for All-type option, hospitals maintain their own systems and the U.K. has
not yet transitioned to a common platform among
all contracting providers.119 Thus, even with adoption
of a Medicare For All-like plan, the same cybersecurity challenges would remain absent a specific focus
on interoperability and common infrastructure and
shared platforms as part of reform efforts.
In contrast, while a single payor system or public
option regime as currently contemplated would not
address all infrastructure challenges that affect cybersecurity, these systems could lessen the chaos and confusion caused by the multiplicity of laws, regulations,
and regulatory agencies governing the industry to the
extent that the payment reform eliminated or reduced
the need for certain legal hurdles. For example, enactment of the Stark Law and renewed enforcement of
the AKS arose out of a fee-for-service payment structure that incentivizes volume of services and services
reimbursed at the highest rate.120 Adopting payment
reform that shifts the focus away from fee-for-service
— or at least away from medical decision making that
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maximizes financial productivity as opposed to quality
care — will reduce the need for application of laws that
hinder collaboration or care coordination. Some of
this payment reform has been ongoing through efforts
to shift payment from volume-based to value-based —
largely a focus on the twin goals of reducing cost and
improving quality care in the form of enhanced outcomes.121 These efforts promote care coordination and
reduction in duplication of services and could help to
enhance cybersecurity if achievement of such goals
promotes collaboration and data sharing. For example, in a bundled payment model, providers will need
to focus on assuring that the most cost efficient and
effective provider is rendering the necessary medical
care, which can be achieved through shared protocols
and shared access to the medical record. A large hospital system that operates a sophisticated cybersecurity
program122 engaged in a bundled payment program
with post-acute providers will likely require cybersecurity controls of the hospital to govern the data
exchange, providing greater protection over devices,
records, and other connected systems. Additionally, to
the extent that collaborating systems begin to promote
greater emphasis on cyber protections, sectors might
also experience cultural shifts as more providers and
suppliers begin to truly understand and appreciate the
importance of cybersecurity.
Independent of infrastructure challenges, perhaps
the biggest barrier to mitigating cyber risk is convincing individuals and entities to make the necessary investments to properly combat the known risks,
which disproportionately impacts smaller and lessresource intensive entities.123 Promoting programs
such as accountable care organizations (ACOs),124
clinically integrated networks (CINs),125 and patientcentered medical homes that encourage larger, more
financially stable entities to share resources with
smaller, less financially stable entities,126 will help
spread cybersecurity resources to the most vulnerable
areas.127 A small physician office is unlikely to employ
an IT professional whose sole focus is maintaining
support for operating electronic systems and combating cyber threats,128 but that same office as a participant in an ACO is able to utilize the resources within
the ACO, facilitating better protection of all data contained within the system.129 ACOs and CINs are incentivized and encouraged to engage in collaboration and
care coordination to achieve cost savings, and these
efforts are most easily accomplished through interoperability or other coordinated data sharing.130 Because
managing cyber risk becomes the responsibility of
the ACO, resources toward this effort can be pooled
and coordinated. Such coordination may also prevent
churn and system migration of small providers, both

of which make electronic systems more vulnerable to
threats due to lack of support from fledgling vendors
and compatibility barriers that prevent system integration and then increase breach costs as providers
migrate to new vendors after each breach incident.131
ACOs, CINs, and like structures will also assist
in moving more rapidly toward interoperability, as
interoperability (done properly) will aid in achieving
quality metrics and reduce expense through reduction
of duplication of services.132 The lack of interoperability in the current health care system has perpetuated
make-shift data sharing mechanisms that are less
secure and make data more vulnerable to cybersecurity risk.133 Congress and CMS should move from voluntary recommendations for interoperability towards
required security regulations and infrastructure standards. Such efforts will be easier to accomplish to
the extent that resources can be allocated across the
care continuum among larger and smaller actors in
the market through reform efforts. Certainly, data
breaches and cyberattacks will not be entirely prevented as a result of these incremental system reforms
— such as ACOs and bundled payment models; however, the health care industry will be better poised and
prepared to address and respond to attacks in a more
efficient and less costly manner to the extent that this
resource allocation can be spread across sectors.
Lastly, the confusion and chaos that is created by
competing statutory and regulatory regimes and agencies remains a difficult issue to adequately address.
There have been efforts by agencies to coordinate
through deference to a common agency, such as recommendations to follow the NIST standards, or waivers of certain laws in lieu of others, such as waivers for
ACOs under the ACA.134 More coordination must take
place, however. While agency consolidation or reconfiguration is unlikely, agencies could today mitigate
existing barriers with promotion of increased coordination between agencies and adoption of regulations
that apply across the industry. It is imperative in the
context of cybersecurity that agencies engage in this
coordinated effort because other initiatives to support
care coordination will be thwarted to the extent that
various sectors in the industry are forced to comply
with disparate statutes, regulations, and directives.

Conclusion
Comprehensive health care reform that includes cybersecurity not just as a thought, but as a purpose and
goal of system redesign would help to most efficiently
and effectively address cybersecurity risk. While no
singular current reform initiative particularly will
address all of the structural challenges that exacerbate cybersecurity risk, many of the reform efforts, if
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implemented and promoted, may make meaningful
progress in the fight against cyber threats and cyberattacks. Identifying applicable vulnerabilities is crucial, but it is clear through the Task Force’s efforts that
many of the challenges cannot be addressed piecemeal
or only by market leaders. Rather, significant movement towards greater cybersecurity must begin with
systematic infrastructure reforms that enhance, support, and promote collaboration, interoperability, and
great sharing of resources. Although some current
reform initiatives could be used for this purpose, these
initiatives have been hindered by lack of administrative support and continuing legal fragility based on
the current waiver framework.135 Therefore, if industry and government leaders want to affect meaningful change to cybersecurity risks, they must start with
basic system reforms that reconsider current delivery
and payment mechanisms with greater focus. These
system reforms will need to continue to consider competing reform goals — quality care, access, and cost
control — which remain challenges to the current
infrastructure. With careful planning, however, many
reforms can also impact and help to address threats
to cybersecurity. The reforms must be system-wide
and implemented across the health care continuum,
maintaining focus on mitigation of cybersecurity risk
as a key goal of the legislation. The Report has been a
first good step to spur the industry to consider cybersecurity as a significant issue in the health care industry. But, meaningful and effective progress in fighting
cyber threats will require leaders to reconsider and
reimagine a different system ready to face the risks
and rewards of an electronic world.
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